```
THOMAS P. O'BRIEN
  1
     United States Attorney
     CHRISTINE C. EWELL
     Assistant United States Attorney
     Chief, Criminal Division
     HARVINDER S. ANAND(Cal. State Bar No.: 243913)
     Assistant United States Attorney
  4
          1400 United States Courthouse
  5
          312 North Spring Street
          Los Angeles, California 90012
          Telephone: (213) 894-2624
  6
          Facsimile: (213) 894-0142
 7
          E-mail: harvinder.anand@usdoj.gov
 8
    Attorney for Plaintiff
     United States of America
 9
10
                        UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                   FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
11
12
     UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                     ) CR No. 08-715(A)-PSG
13
                     Plaintiff,
                                       PLEA AGREEMENT FOR DEFENDANT
                                       STANLEY ALEXANDER HUDSON
14
                   ν.
15
     STANLEY ALEXANDER HUDSON,
       aka "Stanley Alexander,"
16
       aka "Brandon M.
         Courtney,"
17
       aka "Isiah S. Ross,"
       aka "Kenneth Z.
18
     Anderson," and THOMAS EDWIN COCHEE,
19
       aka "Kenneth Anderson,"
       aka "Kevin Ross,"
20
       aka "Jonathan Houston,"
       aka "Nicholas Letterman,"
21
       aka "Rodney Hudson,"
22
                     Defendants.
23
```

1. This constitutes the plea agreement between defendant Stanley Alexander Hudson, also known as ("aka") "Stanley Alexander," aka "Brandon M. Courtney," aka "Isiah S. Ross," and aka "Kenneth Z. Anderson" ("defendant"), and the United States Attorney's Office for the Central District of California ("the



24

25

26

27

USAO") in the above-captioned case. This agreement is limited to

 the USAO and cannot bind any other federal, state or local prosecuting, administrative or regulatory authorities.

PLEAS

2. Defendant agrees to plead guilty to counts eight, ten and fourteen of the First Superseding Indictment in <u>United States</u>
v. Stanley Alexander Hudson, et al., CR No. 08-715(A)-PSG.

## NATURE OF THE OFFENSES

- 3. In order for defendant to be guilty of count eight of the First Superseding Indictment, which charges a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1344, the following must be true:
- (a) Defendant knowingly carried out a scheme or plan to obtain money or property from J.P. Morgan Chase ("J.P. Morgan") by making false statements or promises;
- (b) Defendant knew that the statements or promises were false;
- (c) The statements or promises were material, that is, they would reasonably influence a bank to part with money or property;
  - (d) Defendant acted with the intent to defraud; and
  - (e) J.P. Morgan was federally insured.

Each member of a scheme to defraud is responsible for other co-schemers' actions during the course of and in furtherance of the scheme. If defendant was a member of a scheme to defraud and had the intent to defraud J.P. Morgan, defendant is responsible for what other co-schemers said or did to carry out the scheme, even if defendant did not know what they said or did. For

defendant to be guilty of an offense committed by a co-schemer as part and in furtherance of the scheme, the offense must be one that could reasonably be foreseen as a necessary and natural consequence of the scheme to defraud.

Defendant admits that defendant is, in fact, guilty of this offense, as described in count eight of the First Superseding Indictment.

- 4. In order for defendant to be guilty of count ten of the First Superseding Indictment, which charges a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1028A(a)(1), the following must be true:
- (a) Defendant knowingly transferred, possessed, or used a means of identification of another person;
- (b) The means of identification belonged to another person;
- (c) Defendant knew that the means of identification he transferred, possessed, or used actually belonged to another person;
  - (d) Defendant did so without lawful authority; and
- (e) Defendant did so during and in relation to committing a felony violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344, Bank Fraud, as charged in count eight of the First Superseding Indictment.

Defendant admits that defendant is, in fact, guilty of this offense, as described in count ten of the First Superseding Indictment.

5. In order for defendant to be guilty of count fourteen of the First Superseding Indictment, which charges a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1029(a)(2), the following

must be true:

б

- (a) Defendant knowingly used and trafficked in an unauthorized access device, that is, credit card account number XXXX-XXXX-8455, at any time during a one-year period beginning in or about September 2007, and ending in or about March 2008;
- (b) By using and trafficking in the unauthorized access device during that period, defendant obtained things of value, their value together totaling \$1,000 or more during that period;
  - (c) Defendant acted with the intent to defraud; and
- (d) Defendant's conduct in some way affected commerce between one state and other states.

Defendant admits that defendant is, in fact, guilty of this offense, as described in count fourteen of the First Superseding Indictment.

### PENALTIES AND RESTITUTION

- 6. The statutory maximum sentence that the Court can impose for a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1344, is: 30 years imprisonment; a five-year period of supervised release; a fine of \$1,000,000 or twice the gross gain or gross loss resulting from the offense, whichever is greatest; and a mandatory special assessment of \$100.
- 7. The statutory mandatory minimum sentence that the Court can impose for a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1028A(a)(1), is: 2 years imprisonment, which must run consecutive to any other term of imprisonment imposed on a person under any other provision of law; and a mandatory special

assessment of \$100.

- 8. The statutory maximum sentence that the Court can impose for a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1028A(a)(1), is: 2 years imprisonment, which must run consecutive to any other term of imprisonment imposed on a person under any other provision of law; a 1-year period of supervised release; a fine of \$250,000 or twice the gross gain or gross loss resulting from the offense, whichever is greatest; and a mandatory special assessment of \$100.
- 9. The statutory maximum sentence that the Court can impose for a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1029(a)(2), is: 10 years imprisonment; a three-year period of supervised release; a fine of \$250,000 or twice the gross gain or gross loss resulting from the offense, whichever is greatest; and a mandatory special assessment of \$100.
- 10. Therefore, the total maximum sentence for all offenses to which defendant is pleading guilty is: 42 years imprisonment; a 5-year period of supervised release; a fine of \$1,250,000 or twice the gross gain or gross loss resulting from the offenses, whichever is greatest; and a mandatory special assessment of \$300.
- 11. Defendant understands that defendant will be required to pay full restitution to the victims of the offenses.

  Defendant agrees that, in return for the USAO's compliance with its obligations under this agreement, the amount of restitution is not restricted to the amounts alleged in the counts to which defendant is pleading guilty and may include losses arising from counts dismissed and charges not prosecuted pursuant to this

agreement as well as all relevant conduct in connection with those counts and charges. The parties currently believe that the applicable amount of restitution is approximately \$755,000, but recognize and agree that this amount could change based on facts that come to the attention of the parties prior to sentencing. Defendant further agrees that defendant will not seek the discharge of any restitution obligation, in whole or in part, in any present or future bankruptcy proceeding.

- 12. Supervised release is a period of time following imprisonment during which defendant will be subject to various restrictions and requirements. Defendant understands that if defendant violates one or more of the conditions of any supervised release imposed, defendant may be returned to prison for all or part of the term of supervised release, which could result in defendant serving a total term of imprisonment greater than the statutory maximum stated above.
- 13. Defendant also understands that, by pleading guilty, defendant may be giving up valuable government benefits and valuable civic rights, such as the right to vote, the right to possess a firearm, the right to hold office, and the right to serve on a jury.
- 14. Defendant further understands that the convictions in this case may subject defendant to various collateral consequences, including but not limited to, deportation, revocation of probation, parole, or supervised release in another case, and suspension or revocation of a professional license. Defendant understands that unanticipated collateral consequences will not serve as grounds to withdraw defendant's guilty plea.

FACTUAL BASIS

1

2

3

5

6

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15. Defendant and the USAO agree and stipulate to the statement of facts provided below. This statement of facts includes facts sufficient to support pleas of guilty to the charges described in this agreement and to establish the sentencing guideline factors set forth in paragraph 19 below. It is not meant to be a complete recitation of all facts relevant to the underlying criminal conduct or all facts known to defendant that relate to that conduct.

For more than five years before defendant was arrested in this case on October 29, 2008, defendant, along with defendant Thomas Edwin Cochee, also known as ("aka") "Kenneth Anderson, "aka "Kevin Ross," aka "Jonathan Houston, "aka "Nicholas Letterman," and aka "Rodney Hudson" ("defendant Cochee"), and together with other participants of their scheme (defendant Cochee and the other participants of the scheme are hereinafter collectively called the "co-schemers"), knowingly participated in, carried out and executed a scheme to defraud numerous banks. Defendant and his co-schemers executed the scheme to defraud by opening over 50 fraudulent credit card accounts and charging over \$755,000 to those accounts. Defendant opened the fraudulent credit card accounts himself. Defendant and his co-schemers promised the victim banks, including Bank of America, N.A. ("Bank of America"), Capital One Bank ("Capital One"), Citibank, and J.P. Morgan (hereinafter, each of the individual foregoing banks includes any predecessor bank acquired by it that issued credit cards relevant to this First Superseding Indictment; collectively, the "victim banks"), that they would

repay the charges they made to the credit card accounts, even though defendant never intended to repay, and has not repaid, the victim banks. The promises made by defendant and his co-schemers were material, that is, the banks would not have extended credit to defendant and his co-schemers if the banks knew that neither defendant nor any other co-schemer would repay the charges made to the fraudulent credit cards.

- (b) To execute the scheme, defendant opened the fraudulent credit card accounts by using social security numbers belonging to real people, the names of individuals to whom the social security numbers had not been issued, and dates of birth that were not the real dates of birth of the individuals to whom the social security numbers had been issued. Defendant used over 30 social security numbers belonging to real people during the course of the scheme. Many of the social security numbers that defendant used to open the fraudulent credit cards belonged to minors.
- (c) Defendant gave a real social security number not assigned to himself to at least one other co-schemer to open fraudulent credit card accounts. Defendant knew that the other co-schemer would open credit card accounts with that social security number. Defendant told the other co-schemer that the social security number was "good," which defendant knew to mean that the social security number belonged to a real person and would permit his co-schemer to open fraudulent credit card accounts.
- (d) To execute the scheme to defraud, defendant and his co-schemers opened and used mailboxes at numerous commercial

mailings receiving agencies ("CMRAs") in the Los Angeles area.

Defendant and his co-schemers opened the mailboxes by using false names and fraudulent identification cards. Defendant himself opened at least one of these mailboxes. Defendant also paid his co-schemers to open numerous mailboxes by using fraudulent identification cards. Defendant and his co-schemers used fraudulent identification cards to avoid being apprehended and prosecuted for their participation in the ongoing illegal scheme to defraud banks.

- (e) When defendant submitted applications to the victim banks to open fraudulent credit card accounts, he used the addresses of the CMRAs described above in subparagraph 15(d). Defendant had the victim banks send credit card statements to the CMRAs. Defendant used the addresses of CMRAs to avoid being apprehended and prosecuted for his participation in the ongoing illegal scheme to defraud banks. Defendant also used the address of at least one CMRA to open fraudulent credit card accounts in his own name.
- (f) Acting with the intent to defraud, defendant added his co-schemers as authorized users on several of the fraudulent credit card accounts that he opened and controlled. Defendant did this as part of the scheme to defraud banks so that his co-schemers would be able to make transfers from and charges to the fraudulent credit cards that he opened and controlled.
- (g) For more than the five years before defendant was arrested in this case, defendant and the co-schemers obtained cash advances and made balance transfers and purchases with the fraudulent credit cards. Defendant made purchases for himself

with the fraudulent credit cards and other co-schemers used the fraudulent credit cards to make purchases for themselves and on defendant's behalf. Defendant obtained cash advances for himself with the fraudulent credit cards and co-schemers used fraudulent credit cards to obtain cash advances for themselves and on defendant's behalf.

1

2

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

- (h) For more than the five years before defendant was arrested in this case, defendant and his co-schemers took the following actions to execute the scheme to defraud: (1) drive to CMRAs throughout the Los Angeles area, pick up mail from victim banks, and deliver the mail to defendant; (2) make balance transfers with the fraudulent credit cards; (3) purchase gift cards from stores with the fraudulent credit cards; (4) deposit checks into bank accounts set up by defendant; and (5) go to automated teller machines to withdraw money. For participating in and working with defendant to execute the fraudulent scheme, co-schemers would receive cash and gift cards. Defendant's coschemers purchased gift cards with the fraudulent credit cards and kept some of the gift cards as compensation. Defendant's coschemers also made and kept purchases with the fraudulent credit cards. Defendant also used the fraudulent credit cards to obtain cash advances and make purchases for himself.
- (i) Defendant acted with the intent to defraud the victim banks, including Bank of America, Capital One, Citibank and JP Morgan. Defendant admits that the scheme to defraud had been ongoing for at least the five years prior to his arrest, that the scheme involved himself and defendant Cochee, and others. Defendant knew that banks were losing money as a direct

result of his actions in carrying out the scheme to defraud.

- (j) Defendant made some payments to the victim banks, but only to make it appear to the banks that the fraudulent accounts were actually legitimate accounts. Defendant made those payments so that the banks would continue to extend him credit, knowing that he would not repay the victim banks whatever the balances were when the banks eventually discovered that the accounts were in fact fraudulent. Defendant agrees that the victim banks have lost at least \$755,000 as a direct result and consequence of his scheme to defraud.
- (k) Defendant used the money that he obtained from the fraudulent accounts for his personal financial gain. Among other things, defendant purchased expensive watches, electronic equipment, bearer bonds, and real estate with the money that he derived from the scheme to defraud.
- (1) On or about August 17, 2007, defendant submitted an application to J.P. Morgan to open a fraudulent credit card account. Defendant submitted the application in the name of "Brandon M. Courtney" and used Social Security Number XXX-XX-0012. Relying on defendant's fraudulent application, J.P. Morgan opened credit card account number XXXX-XXXX-XXXX-8455 in the name of "Brandon M. Courtney." J.P. Morgan was federally insured at all times relevant to this case.
- (m) From September 2007 through March 2008, defendant used fraudulent credit card account number XXXX-XXXX-XXXX-8455 to obtain cash advances and make balance transfers and purchases.

  Defendant knowingly and intentionally took actions, and defendant's co-schemers took actions in concert with defendant,

as described above, that were necessary to commit this crime. As a result, defendant and his co-schemers obtained things of value totaling approximately \$55,000, which neither defendant nor any of his co-schemers has repaid. Accordingly, J.P. Morgan has lost approximately \$55,000 on fraudulent credit card account number XXXX-XXXX-XXXX-8455. Defendant's conduct affected interstate commerce between California an other states because, among other things, the United States mails were used by J.P. Morgan to send credit card account statements to a CMRA in the Los Angeles area.

- (n) Defendant used the name "Brandon M. Courtney" and the social security number XXX-XX-0012 to open fraudulent credit card account number XXXX-XXXX-XXXX-8455 with J.P. Morgan. When defendant submitted the application to J.P. Morgan, he acted willfully, knowing that (1) his name was not "Brandon M. Courtney"; (2) his social security number was not XXX-XX-0012; and (3) social security number XXX-XX-0012 belonged a real person.
- (o) The United States Social Security Administration has confirmed that a real person has been assigned social security number XXX-XX-0012.
- (p) Defendant did not at any time have lawful authority to transfer, possess, or use social security number XXX-XX-0012.
- (q) Defendant used social security number XXX-XX-0012 to, among other things, obtain credit from J.P. Morgan by using another person's true social security number, disguise his true identity, conceal his illegal activities, including during and in relation to committing Bank Fraud, as charged in count eight of

(r) Defendant agrees that the following institutions were victims of his scheme to defraud because they lost money as a direct consequence of the scheme: (1) First USA, (2) J.P. Morgan, (3) Bank of America, (4) Capital One, (5) Discover, (6) American Express, (7) Washington Mutual, (8) MBNA America Bank National Association, (9) Banco Popular, and (10) Wells Fargo.

# WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

- 16. By pleading guilty, defendant gives up the following rights:
  - (a) The right to persist in a plea of not guilty.
  - (b) The right to a speedy and public trial by jury.
- (c) The right to the assistance of legal counsel at trial, including the right to have the Court appoint counsel for defendant for the purpose of representation at trial. (In this regard, defendant understands that, despite his pleas of guilty, he retains the right to be represented by counsel and, if necessary, to have the court appoint counsel if defendant cannot afford counsel at every other stage of the proceedings.)
- (d) The right to be presumed innocent and to have the burden of proof placed on the government to prove defendant quilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
- (e) The right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against defendant.
- (f) The right, if defendant wished, to testify on defendant's own behalf and present evidence in opposition to the charges, including the right to call witnesses and to subpoena

those witnesses to testify.

1

2

4

5

б

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(g) The right not to be compelled to testify, and, if defendant chose not to testify or present evidence, to have that choice not be used against defendant.

By pleading guilty, defendant also gives up any and all rights to pursue any affirmative defenses, Fourth Amendment or Fifth Amendment claims, and other pretrial motions that have been filed or could be filed.

#### WAIVER OF DNA TESTING

Defendant has been advised that the government has in its possession the following items of physical evidence that could be subjected to DNA testing: (a) physical evidence seized from defendant Cochee on June 10, 2008, when he was arrested in this case; (b) physical evidence seized from defendant and his home on October 29, 2008, when he was arrested in this case; and (c) all other physical evidence acquired during the course of investigating this case. Defendant understands that the government does not intend to conduct DNA testing of any of these items or any other item. Defendant understands that, before entering quilty pleas pursuant to this agreement, defendant could request DNA testing of evidence in this case. Defendant further understands that, with respect to the offenses to which defendant is pleading guilty pursuant to this agreement, defendant would have the right to request DNA testing of evidence after conviction under the conditions specified in 18 U.S.C. Knowing and understanding defendant's right to request DNA testing, defendant knowingly and voluntarily gives up that right with respect to both the specific items listed above and

any other item of evidence there may be in this case that might be amenable to DNA testing. Defendant understands and acknowledges that by giving up this right, defendant is giving up any ability to request DNA testing of evidence in this case in the current proceeding, in any proceeding after conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 3600, and in any other proceeding of any type. Defendant further understands and acknowledges that by giving up this right, defendant will never have another opportunity to have the evidence in this case, whether or not listed above, submitted for DNA testing, or to employ the results of DNA testing to support a claim that defendant is innocent of the offenses to which defendant is pleading guilty.

#### SENTENCING FACTORS

18. Defendant understands that the Court is required to consider the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)-(7), including the kinds of sentence and sentencing range established under the United States Sentencing Guidelines ("U.S.S.G." or "Sentencing Guidelines"), in determining defendant's sentence. Defendant further understands that the Sentencing Guidelines are advisory only, and that after considering the Sentencing Guidelines and the other § 3553(a) factors, the Court may be free to exercise its discretion to impose any reasonable sentence up to the maximum set by statute for the crimes of conviction.

25 ///

26 ///

27 ///

28 ///

19. Defendant and the USAO agree and stipulate to the following applicable Sentencing Guideline factors:

# Counts Eight and Fourteen:

Base Offense Level: 7 [U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(a)(1)]

Loss more than \$400,000, less than

\$1,000,00: +14 [U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(H)]

10 or more victims: +2 [U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)]

### Count Ten:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Two years imprisonment [U.S.S.G. §§ 2B1.6 and consecutive to the sentence imposed on Counts Eight and Fourteen.

Defendant and the USAO reserve the right to argue that additional specific offense characteristics, adjustments and departures under the Sentencing Guidelines are appropriate. Specifically, the USAO reserves the right to argue that an increase in the offense level in addition to the 14 levels agreed to by the parties for the loss amount is appropriate under U.S.S.G. § The government currently believes that the 2B1.1(b)(1). applicable amount of loss for which defendant is responsible is approximately \$755,000. Defendant recognizes and agrees that this amount could change based on facts that come to the attention of the parties prior to sentencing, which may subject defendant to a higher loss amount and corresponding sentencing The USAO also reserves the right to argue that an increase in defendant's offense level under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c), based on defendant's aggravating role, is appropriate. event that defendant's offense level is so altered, the parties

1.0

- 20. There is no agreement as to defendant's criminal history or criminal history category.
- 21. Defendant and the USAO, pursuant to the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3), (a)(6), and (a)(7), further reserve the right to argue for a sentence outside the sentencing range established by the Sentencing Guidelines.
- the United States Probation Office or the Court. Both defendant and the USAO are free to: (a) supplement the facts by supplying relevant information to the United States Probation Office and the Court, (b) correct any and all factual misstatements relating to the calculation of the sentence, and (c) argue on appeal and collateral review that the Court's Sentencing Guidelines calculations are not error, although each party agrees to maintain its view that the calculations in paragraph 19 are consistent with the facts of this case.

#### DEFENDANT'S OBLIGATIONS

- 23. Defendant agrees that he will:
  - (a) Plead guilty as set forth in this agreement.
- (b) Not knowingly and willfully fail to abide by all sentencing stipulations contained in this agreement.
- (c) Not knowingly and willfully fail to: (i) appear as ordered for all court appearances, (ii) surrender as ordered for service of sentence, (iii) obey all conditions of any bond, and (iv) obey any other ongoing court order in this matter.
- (d) Not commit any crime; however, offenses which would be excluded for sentencing purposes under U.S.S.G. §

4A1.2(c) are not within the scope of this agreement.

- (e) Not knowingly and willfully fail to be truthful at all times with Pretrial Services, the U.S. Probation Office, and the Court.
- (f) Pay the applicable special assessments at or before the time of sentencing unless defendant lacks the ability to pay.
  - 24. Defendant further agrees:

- (a) To forfeit all right, title, and interest in and to all such items, specifically including, but not limited to, all right, title and interest in and to:
- (1) The real property located at 5714 Rimpau Boulevard, Los Angeles, CA 90043;
- (2) \$69,931, seized from defendant's home on October 29, 2008, and all other United States currency, wherever located;
- (3) Thirty-eight Series EE Savings Bonds, seized from defendant's home on October 29, 2008; and
- (4) The following six watches and one watch winder, seized from defendant's home on October 29, 2008: one Omega Seamaster "Aqua Terra" watch; one Omega "Seamaster Professional" watch; one Omega Seamaster "Planet Ocean" watch; one Breitling "Super Avenger" watch; one alleged counterfeit Breitling watch; one Breitling "Super Avenger" watch; and one Wolf design watch winder.
- (b) To the Court's entry of an order of forfeiture at or before sentencing with respect to these assets and to the forfeiture of the assets.

- (c) To take whatever steps are necessary to pass to the United States clear title to the assets described above, including, without limitation, the execution of a consent decree of forfeiture and the completing of any other legal documents required for the transfer of title to the United States.
- (d) Not to contest any administrative forfeiture proceedings or civil judicial proceedings commenced against these properties. With respect to any criminal forfeiture ordered as a result of this plea agreement, defendant waives the requirements of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 32.2 and 43(a) regarding notice of the forfeiture in the charging instrument, announcements of the forfeiture sentencing, and incorporation of the forfeiture in the judgment. Defendant acknowledges that forfeiture of the assets is part of the sentence that may be imposed in this case and waives any failure by the court to advise defendant of this, pursuant to Rule 11(b)(1)(J), at the time defendant's guilty plea is accepted.
- (e) Not to assist any other individual in any effort falsely to contest the forfeiture of the assets described above.
- (f) Not to claim that reasonable cause to seize the assets was lacking.
- (g) To prevent the disbursement of any and all assets described above if such disbursements are within defendant's direct or indirect control.
- (h) To fill out and deliver to the USAO a completed financial statement listing defendant's assets on a form provided by the United States Attorney's Office.
  - (i) That forfeiture of assets described above shall

shall not be counted toward satisfaction of any special assessment, fine, restitution, or any other penalty the Court may impose. However, if the Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section ("AFMLS") of the Department of Justice grants any petition for remission submitted by a victim of defendant's illegal activities as set forth in the First Superseding Indictment, then the USAO will not object to defendant receiving credit towards payment of restitution in the amount of the lesser of (1) the amount actually paid to the victim pursuant to the grant of the petition for remission by AFMLS; or (2) the amount of the victim's loss reflected in the court's restitution order.

#### THE USAO'S OBLIGATIONS

- 25. If defendant complies fully with all defendant's obligations under this agreement, the USAO agrees:
- (a) To abide by all sentencing stipulations contained in this agreement.
- (b) At the time of sentencing, provided that defendant demonstrates an acceptance of responsibility for the offenses up to and including the time of sentencing, to move to dismiss the remaining counts of the First Superseding Indictment as against defendant. Defendant agrees, however, that at the time of sentencing the Court may consider the dismissed counts in determining the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range, where the sentence should fall within that range, the propriety and extent of any departure from that range, and the determination of the sentence to be imposed after consideration of the sentencing guidelines and all other relevant factors.
  - (c) At the time of sentencing, provided that defendant

demonstrates an acceptance of responsibility for the offenses up to and including the time of sentencing, to recommend a two-level reduction in the applicable sentencing guideline offense level, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, and to recommend and, if necessary, move for an additional one-level reduction if available under that section.

#### BREACH OF AGREEMENT

- 26. If defendant, at any time after the execution of this agreement, knowingly violates or fails to perform any of defendant's agreements or obligations under this agreement ("a breach"), the USAO may declare this agreement breached. If the USAO declares this agreement breached at any time following its execution, and the Court finds such a breach to have occurred, then: (a) if defendant has previously entered guilty pleas, defendant will not be able to withdraw the guilty pleas, and (b) the USAO will be relieved of all of its obligations under this agreement.
- 27. Following the Court's finding of a knowing and willful breach of this agreement by defendant, should the USAO elect to pursue any charge that was either dismissed or not filed as a result of this agreement, then:
- (a) Defendant agrees that any applicable statute of limitations is tolled between the date of defendant's signing of this agreement and the commencement of any such prosecution or action.
- (b) Defendant gives up all defenses based on the statute of limitations, any claim of pre-indictment delay, or any speedy trial claim with respect to any such prosecution, except

to the extent that such defenses existed as of the date of defendant's signing this agreement.

(c) Defendant agrees that: (i) any statements made by defendant, under oath, at the guilty plea hearing (if such a hearing occurred prior to the breach); (ii) the stipulated factual basis statement in this agreement; and (iii) any evidence derived from such statements, are admissible against defendant in any such prosecution of defendant, and defendant shall assert no claim under the United States Constitution, any statute, Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 11(f) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, or any other federal rule, that the statements or any evidence derived from any statements should be suppressed or are inadmissible.

## LIMITED MUTUAL WAIVER OF APPEAL

- 28. Defendant gives up the right to appeal any sentence imposed by the Court, including any order of restitution, and the manner in which the sentence is determined, provided that (a) the sentence is within the statutory maximum specified above and is constitutional, and (b) the Court imposes a sentence within or below the range corresponding to a total offense level of 22, and the applicable criminal history category as determined by the Court. Notwithstanding the foregoing, defendant retains any ability defendant has to appeal the Court's determination of defendant's criminal history category and the conditions of supervised release imposed by the Court, with the exception of the following:
- (a) Conditions set forth in General Orders 318, 01-05, and/or 05-02 of this Court;

(b) The drug testing conditions mandated by 18 U.S.C. §§ 3563(a)(5) and 3583(d);

- (c) The alcohol and drug use conditions authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(7);
- (d) Defendant shall not possess or use a device with access to any online service at any location without the prior approval of the Probation Officer. This includes access through any Internet service provider, bulletin board system, or any public or private computer network system. Further, defendant shall not have another individual access the Internet on defendant's behalf to obtain files or information that defendant is restricted from accessing personally, or accept restricted files or information from another person;
- (e) Defendant shall use only those computers, computer-related devices, screen/user names, passwords, e-mail accounts, and Internet Service Providers (ISPs) approved by the Probation Officer. Computer and computer-related devices include, but are not limited to, personal computers, personal data assistants (PDAs), Internet appliances, electronic games, and cellular telephones, as well as peripheral equipment, that can access, or can be modified to access, the Internet, electronic bulletin boards, other computers, or similar media. Defendant shall use any approved computers only within the scope of his employment. Defendant shall not access a computer for any other purpose. Defendant shall immediately report any changes in defendant's employment affecting defendant's access and/or use of computers or the Internet, including e-mail; and
  - (f) All computers, computer-related devices, computer

storage media, and peripheral equipment used by defendant shall be subject to search and seizure, and subject to the installation of search and/or monitoring software and/or hardware, including unannounced seizure for the purpose of search. Defendant shall not add, remove, upgrade, update, reinstall, repair, or otherwise modify the hardware or software on any computers, computer-related devices, or peripheral equipment without the prior approval of the Probation Officer, nor shall defendant hide or encrypt files or data. Further, defendant shall, as requested by the Probation Officer, provide all billing records, including telephone, cable, Internet, satellite, and similar records.

29. The USAO gives up its right to appeal the sentence, provided that (a) the sentence is within the statutory minimum and maximum specified above and is constitutional, and (b) the Court imposes a sentence within or above the range corresponding to a total offense level of 22, and the applicable criminal history category as determined by the Court.

#### RESULT OF VACATUR, REVERSAL OR SET-ASIDE

30. Defendant agrees that if any count of conviction is vacated, reversed, or set aside, the USAO may: (a) ask the Court to resentence defendant on any remaining counts of conviction, with both the USAO and defendant being released from any stipulations regarding sentencing contained in this agreement, (b) ask the Court to void the entire plea agreement and vacate defendant's guilty plea on any remaining counts of conviction, with both the USAO and defendant being released from all of their obligations under this agreement, or (c) leave defendant's remaining convictions, sentence, and plea agreement intact.

Defendant agrees that the choice among these three options rests in the exclusive discretion of the USAO.

#### COURT NOT A PARTY

The Court is not a party to this agreement and need not • 31. accept any of the USAO's sentencing recommendations or the parties' stipulations. Even if the Court ignores any sentencing recommendation, finds facts or reaches conclusions different from any stipulation, and/or imposes any sentence up to the maximum established by statute, defendant cannot, for that reason, withdraw defendant's guilty pleas, and defendant will remain bound to fulfill all defendant's obligations under this agreement. No one - not the prosecutor, defendant's attorney, or the Court - can make a binding prediction or promise regarding the sentence defendant will receive, except that it will be within the statutory maximum.

### NO ADDITIONAL AGREEMENTS

Except as set forth herein, there are no promises, understandings or agreements between the USAO and defendant or defendant's counsel. Nor may any additional agreement, understanding or condition be entered into unless in a writing signed by all parties or on the record in court.

22 III

1

3

4

6

7

8

9

1.0

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

23 ///

24 ///

25 ///

26 ///

27 ///

28 ///

#### PLEA AGREEMENT PART OF THE GUILTY PLEA HEARING 1 The parties agree and stipulate that this Agreement 2 will be considered part of the record of defendant's guilty plea 3 hearing as if the entire Agreement had been read into the record 4 of the proceeding. 5 This agreement is effective upon signature by defendant and 6 7 an Assistant United States Attorney. AGREED AND ACCEPTED 8 UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 9 FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 THOMAS P. O'BRIEN 11 United States Attorney April 10,2009 Hanh of. 12 HARVINDER S. ANAND 13 Assistant United States Attorney 14 111 15 16 /// 17 /// /// 18 1// 19 20 III111 21 /// 22 /// 23 24 /// III25 III26 27 III28 ///

I have read this agreement and carefully discussed every part of it with my attorney. I understand the terms of this agreement, and I voluntarily agree to those terms. My attorney has advised me of my rights, of possible defenses, of the Sentencing Guideline provisions, and of the consequences of entering into this agreement. No promises or inducements have been made to me other than those contained in this agreement. No one has threatened or forced me in any way to enter into this agreement. Finally, I am satisfied with the representation of my attorney in this matter.

STANLEX ADEXANDER HUDSON Defendant

Date

I am Stanley Alexander Hudson's attorney. I have carefully discussed every part of this agreement with my client. Further, I have fully advised my client of his rights, of possible defenses, of the Sentencing Guidelines' provisions, and of the consequences of entering into this agreement. To my knowledge, my client's decision to enter into this agreement is an informed and voluntary one.

DAVID R. REED

Counsel for Defendant

STANLEY ALEXANDER HUDSON

-27-